The Alienability of Evidentiary Privileges: Of Property and Evidence, Burden and Benefit, Hearsay and Privilege by Imwinkelried, Edward J.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 80 
Number 2 Volume 80, Spring 2006, Number 2 Article 1 
February 2012 
The Alienability of Evidentiary Privileges: Of Property and 
Evidence, Burden and Benefit, Hearsay and Privilege 
Edward J. Imwinkelried 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Imwinkelried, Edward J. (2006) "The Alienability of Evidentiary Privileges: Of Property and Evidence, 
Burden and Benefit, Hearsay and Privilege," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 80 : No. 2 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol80/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
THE ALIENABILITY OF EVIDENTIARY
PRIVILEGES: OF PROPERTY AND
EVIDENCE, BURDEN AND BENEFIT,
HEARSAY AND PRIVILEGE
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIEDt
"[G]overnment has no other end but the
preservation of property. . .
INTRODUCTION
Property and Evidence are two of the most ancient doctrinal
areas in Anglo-American law. Courses devoted to these subjects
are fixtures in the law school curriculum, and the subjects have
generated a huge volume of commentary, including major
treatises.2
Predictably, interfaces have developed between the doctrinal
areas. For example, in hearsay doctrine, testimony about an
unavailable declarant's out-of-court statement disserving his or
her proprietary interest is considered so reliable that it is
exceptionally admissible. 3 Thus, if there were a lawsuit between
the declarant's successor in title and a third party, the
declarant's statements would be admissible against the new
owner over a hearsay objection. The assumption is that the
typical person is so aware of and so concerned about his property
interests that he would not say something contrary to those
f Edward L. Barrett, Jr. Professor of Law, University of California at Davis;
former chair, Evidence Section, American Association of Law Schools; author, THE
NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES (2002) (2 vols.). The author would like to
thank Mr. Daniel Vecchio, class of 2007, University of California, Davis Law School,
who provided research assistance on this Article.
1 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 53-54 (Thomas P.
Peardon ed., Liberal Arts Press 1952) (1690).
2 See, e.g., 1 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY (Michael Allan
Wolf ed., 2005) [17 vols.]; 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (Peter Tillers rev.,
1983) [10 vols.].
3 See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
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interests unless it were true.4 Moreover, in many jurisdictions,
in a lawsuit against a new owner, a third party would not even
have to invoke the declaration-against-interest hearsay
exception. At common law, if a person's predecessor in title to
property made a statement about title to property, the statement
was admissible against the current title holder as a vicarious
admission. 5 A Georgia statute refers to vicarious admissions by
"privies in estate."6
On close scrutiny, however, the interface between Property
and Evidence seems inconsistent. As the preceding paragraph
indicates, a subsequent owner takes title burdened by hearsay
evidence generated by his predecessor. The inconsistency is that
while the subsequent owner must shoulder the burdens, he does
not receive the evidentiary benefits. More specifically, as we
shall see, the new owner generally does not receive the benefit of
any evidentiary privileges that the predecessor enjoyed for
statements relating to the property.
A recent California case involving a show business legend,
the late Bing Crosby, is illustrative. The style of the case is HLC
Properties Ltd. v. Superior Court.7 The litigation centered on the
question of the percentage royalty that Mr. Crosby was owed by
his record company. The plaintiff, HLC, was a partnership
formed by some of Mr. Crosby's surviving relatives and others.
The defendant was MCA, a successor to Decca Records. The
plaintiff claimed that for years the defendant had underpaid
royalties under its contracts with Mr. Crosby. The defendant
countered that the royalty provisions in the written contracts
were ambiguous and that it was entitled to present extrinsic
evidence of the parties' intentions. To gather such evidence, the
defendant demanded the production of records documenting
communications between Mr. Crosby and his attorneys about the
contracts. The plaintiff objected to discovery on the ground that
the documents were protected by the attorney-client privilege
and that the plaintiff was entitled to assert the privilege.
4 See 2 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 317, at 318 (John
W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999).
5 See id. § 260, at 161-62; see also David J. Langum, Uncodified Federal
Evidence Rules Applicable to Civil Trials, 19 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 513, 521-22
(1983).
6 GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-32 (2005).
4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 898 (Ct. App. 2003), rev'd, 105 P.3d 560 (Cal. 2005).
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The record indicated that during his lifetime, Mr. Crosby had
assembled a business staff, sometimes called Bing Crosby
Enterprises ("BCE"), to help him administer his properties. The
contracts and properties themselves went into probate when Mr.
Crosby died. As previously stated, after his death, some of
Crosby's surviving relatives and third parties formed HLC. The
probate court approved the transfer of the contracts and
properties to HLC.
Based on this record, the trial judge overruled the plaintiffs
objection. The trial judge found that during his lifetime, Bing
Crosby was the client with control over any evidentiary privilege.
The judge further ruled that although after his death Crosby's
privilege passed to his personal representative, the privilege
terminated when the representative was discharged at the end of
probate.8 In so ruling, the trial judge relied on section 953 of the
California Evidence Code. That statute enumerates the holders
of the attorney-client privilege:
As used in this Article, "holder of the privilege" means:
(a) The client when he has no guardian or conservator.
(b) A guardian or conservator of the client when the client
has a guardian or conservator.
(c) The personal representative of the client if the client is
dead.
(d) A successor, assign, trustee in dissolution, or any
similar representative of a firm, association,
organization, partnership, business trust, corporation,
or public entity that is no longer in existence. 9
The trial judge concluded that subdivision (c) is controlling when
the original holder is a natural person rather than an entity.
That conclusion dictated overruling the objection. If the privilege
terminated on the discharge of Mr. Crosby's executor, there was
no remaining privilege for HLC, or anyone else for that matter, to
assert.
HLC sought an extraordinary writ to force the trial judge to
sustain its objection. The intermediate appellate court, the Court
of Appeal, issued the writ. Initially, the court held that even
during Mr. Crosby's lifetime, he did not hold the privilege.
Although he consulted the attorneys and held title to the
properties that were the subject of the consultations, in the
s Id. at 900-02.
9 CAL. EVID. CODE § 953 (Deering 2004).
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court's view, BCE was the holder. Citing the reference to
"organization" in section 953(d), the court declared: "[t]he record
reveals a substantial gathering of creative and management
personnel engaged in the business of contributing to, producing
and exploiting entertainment programs and the services of
Crosby .... Given its activities, Bing Crosby Enterprises was an
on-going organization that held the attorney-client
privilege . . . ."10 Next, the court ruled that after Crosby's death,
BCE could transfer the privilege to HLC.
Since the stakes were high-the amount of royalties in
question ran into the millions-MCA understandably appealed.
On appeal, in early 2005, a unanimous California Supreme Court
reversed the lower court and reinstated the trial judge's ruling.'
Reasoning in straightforward fashion, the court held that during
Mr. Crosby's life, the privilege belonged to him. It noted that the
official California Law Revision Commission comments provided
three examples of unincorporated "organizations" capable of
holding a privilege: labor unions; social clubs; and fraternal
societies. The court added:
[E]ach of the three unincorporated organizations the
Commission lists is a collective entity that the Internal Revenue
Code recognizes as having tax exempt status. Additionally, the
assets of the listed organizations generally are not subject to
probate administration when their individual members die.
Here, there is no suggestion that [Bing Crosby] Enterprises
qualified for tax exempt status, and the ... recording contracts
at issue were probated as part of Crosby's estate .... 12
The court stated: "[h]ere, the trial [judge] found that Crosby, the
natural person, not Enterprises or any other business
organization, was the client who sought legal advice .... As a
reviewing court, we may not disturb the trial court's finding if
there is any substantial evidence to support it."'13 The court
found ample evidence to sustain the trial judge's determination.
The court next ruled that when Mr. Crosby died, the privilege
automatically transferred to his personal representative, the
executor of his estate. Finally, citing other Commission
10 HLC Properties Ltd., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 903.
1 See HLC Properties Ltd. v. Superior Court, 105 P.3d 560, 569 (Cal. 2005).
12 Id. at 565 (citations omitted).
13 Id.; see Hudson Sangree, Bing Crosby's Managers Lose Discovery Row, DAILY
RECORDER (Sacramento, Cal.), Feb.16, 2005, at 1.
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comments to the Evidence Court, the court concluded that the
privilege terminated when Mr. Crosby's representative was
discharged. If so, there was no privilege left for HLC to assert.
The California Supreme Court's conclusion seems defensible
as a matter of statutory construction. However, as a matter of
logic and policy, that outcome is hardly inexorable. To begin
with, there is respectable English authority that when a person
becomes a successor in title to realty, he also becomes the holder
of the prior owner's attorney-client communications with respect
to the property.' 4 Those authorities treat the privilege as one of
the incidents of title, inuring to the benefit of the new owner. 15
Furthermore, in the case of entities such as corporations, the
American authorities frequently hold that a successor entity
takes both its predecessor's title and the evidentiary privileges
for communications pertinent to the property. 16 The author had
the opportunity to consult with the defense attorneys who
prevailed before the California Supreme Court in the Crosby
litigation.
At one point, when all the research and briefing had been
completed, one of those attorneys astutely remarked that our
research had not uncovered any good discussion of the policy
question of whether a natural person's evidentiary privileges
should be alienable. That remark sparked the author's interest
in this subject.
The purpose of this Article is to initiate a discussion of that
question and to share some preliminary thoughts on the topic.
The thesis of this Article is that a natural person's evidentiary
privileges should be inalienable both by operation of law and
even by act of the parties. To develop that general thesis, the
Article addresses four specific topics. The initial part of the
Article analyzes the threshold question of whether, in terms of
the alienability of privileges, it is justifiable to treat natural
persons and entities differently. Positing that differential
treatment is warranted, the next part of the Article deals with
the issue of whether the attorney-client privilege of a property
14 See L.H. HOFFMAN, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE 190 (2d ed. 1970)
(citing Calcraft v. Guest, (1898) 1 Q.B.D. 759); M.N. HOWARD ET AL., PHIPSON ON
EVIDENCE 507 (14th ed. 1990); ADRIAN KEANE, THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE 583
(5th ed. 2000).
15 See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY
PRIVILEGES § 6.5.2, at 87-88 (Cumulative Supp. 2006).
16 See 1 id. § 6.5.2.c, at 573 (Richard D. Friedman ed., 2002).
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owner should automatically pass to a successor titleholder. The
third part discusses the related question of whether the privilege
ought to be alienable by a voluntary act of the original holder.
The final part of the Article asks whether the preceding analysis
is, in effect, "much ado about nothing." Assuming that the
general norm ought to be inalienability, should the original
holder be able to circumvent that norm by the simple expedient
of appointing the new titleholder his or her agent for the purpose
of asserting or waiving the privilege? At the end of this line of
analysis, hopefully this Article will not only construct a case for
its general thesis, but even more importantly, yield some insight
into the very nature of evidentiary privileges in American law.
I. IN TERMS OF THE ALIENABILITY OF PRIVILEGES,
IS IT JUSTIFIABLE TO TREAT NATURAL PERSONS
AND ENTITIES DIFFERENTLY?
The introduction observed that, in the United Kingdom,
there is precedent that whether the original titleholder is a
natural person or an entity, when it passes title to a successor,
the successor takes both the predecessor's property interest and
the attorney-client privilege for the predecessor's
communications related to the property. 17 Whether the original
holder is an entity or a natural person, the evidentiary privilege
goes hand in hand with the related property.
In most jurisdictions within the United States, however,
there is a sharp contrast between the judicial treatment of
entities and natural persons. Section 953 of the California
Evidence Code, previously quoted, reflects the contrast. In HLC
Properties Ltd., the California Supreme Court relied on
subdivision (c), which states that the personal representative of a
natural person is a successor holder of the person's privilege.
Since the statute made no mention of heirs-the most obvious
candidates to become successor holders after the
representative-the court reasoned that the wording of
subdivision (c) strongly implied that the privilege terminated
upon the representative's discharge. Moreover, the implication
from the statutory text confirmed the extrinsic legislative history
indicating that the drafters intended to terminate the privilege
when the probate court discharged the representative. However,
17 See supra note 14.
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subdivision (d) of the same statute provides that the expression,
"holder of the privilege" includes: "[a] successor, assign, trustee
in dissolution, or any similar representative of a firm,
association, organization, partnership, business trust,
corporation, or public entity that is no longer in existence."' 8
Hence, while the privilege of a deceased natural person
seemingly terminates under subdivision (c), when the person's
representative is discharged, subdivision (d) appears to announce
that a "successor" entity may assert a previous entity's privilege.
Other American jurisdictions have reached this result by case
law.19
By way of example, in Commodity Futures Trading
Commission v. Weintraub,20 the United States Supreme Court
ruled that a corporation's bankruptcy trustee is entitled to waive
the privilege for management's prebankruptcy communications
with corporate counsel. To be sure, if a second corporation
acquires only title to an isolated piece of property or asset
belonging to another corporation, the second corporation does not
become the holder of the right to the other corporation's
evidentiary privilege. 21 However, when the management is also
transferred to the second corporation, the new corporation is a
successor in interest to the old entity, 22 and the right to assert or
waive the privilege passes to the latter corporation. 23 The second
corporation can become a successor in interest either by a
consensual transaction or by operation of law such as
subrogation. 24 Thus, at least in some cases, when an entity
18 CAL. EVID. CODE § 953 (Deering 2004).
19 See Ramada Franchise Sys. v. Hotel of Gainesville Assocs., 988 F. Supp. 1460,
1463 (N.D. Ga. 1997); Paul R. Rice, A Quasi-Attorney-Client Privilege? West
Virginia's Mislabeled Fiduciary Duty Exception, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 311, 317 (1998)
(citing Texaco, Inc. v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 264 A.2d 523 (Del. Ch. 1970) and stating
the general rule that "[t]he trustee of a corporate client acquires the privilege rights
of the client upon his appointment").
20 471 U.S. 343 (1985).
21 See Ramada, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 1464; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 cmt. k (2000) (citing Sobol v. E.P. Dutton, Inc., 112 F.R.D.
99, 102-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (sale of right to intellectual property) and NL Indus., Inc.
v. Koomey, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 936, 936 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (transfer of patent)).
22 See 1 PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES
§ 4:27, at 121-22 (2d ed. 1999).
23 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 cmt. k
(citing Dickerson v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99 (Ct. App. 1982)).
24 See 1 RICE, supra note 22, § 4:43 at 250.
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acquires title to property previously owned by another entity, the
evidentiary privilege passes with the title.
Despite the English precedent and the partial alienability of
entities' evidentiary privileges, it is submitted that the
differential treatment of entities and natural persons is
justifiable. An entity is a legal construct. The leading definition
of an entity is "[a]n organization (such as a business or
governmental unit) that has a legal identity apart from its
members."25  The artificial 26 entity is the sum of the legal
relations created by the state.27 In the contemplation of the law,
at its essence, an artificial entity is the bundle of legal rights,
powers, duties, and liabilities recognized by the state. When, to a
substantial degree, another entity undertakes the identical
rights, powers, duties, and liabilities, the new entity essentially
becomes the prior entity.
The same cannot be said of natural persons. A natural
person has an independent existence and reality apart from the
state. Although a natural person may possess or have legal
rights, powers, duties, and liabilities, the natural person cannot
be equated with them; a natural person is not the mere sum of
his or her legal rights and duties in the same sense that an
artificial entity is. Likewise, one natural person does not become
another natural person simply because the former acquires the
legal rights and powers of the latter. A natural person cannot
transfer his essence to another natural person in the same way
that an entity can transfer its legal essence to another entity.
When, as in a merger, one artificial entity has extensively
assumed the other legal rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of
another entity, it makes sense to say that the former has become
the latter and should therefore succeed to the latter's evidentiary
privileges. The same argument cannot be made in the case of
natural persons.
25 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 573 (8th ed. 2004).
26 See 1 JOHN P. DAVIS, CORPORATIONS: A STUDY OF THE ORIGIN AND
DEVELOPMENT OF GREAT BUSINESS COMBINATIONS AND OF THEIR RELATIONS TO THE
AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 16-17 (1971) (stating that the corporate form is artificial
and exceptional).
27 See id. at 16. See generally FREDERICK HALLIS, CORPORATE PERSONALITY: A
STUDY IN JURISPRUDENCE (1930). Chapter I is devoted to the Fiction Theory. "[T]he
juristic person is nothing more than a persona ficta. The juristic person is a fiction
and its author is the state." Id. at 7.
[Vol. 80:497
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Suppose that Corporation A takes over the business of
Corporation B and B dissolves. Corporation A accepts a complete
assignment of all of Corporation B's contract and property rights
as well as a complete delegation of all of Corporation B's duties.
Since the rights and duties are constitutive of artificial entities
such as corporations, Corporation A has become the same legal
person as Corporation B in a way in which Alice can never
become the same natural person as Brian. There are
fundamental differences between natural persons and artificial
entities. Given those differences, a court can consistently hold
that a transfer of legal rights and duties entitles a successor
entity to assert a predecessor entity's evidentiary privileges while
simultaneously ruling that no matter how many rights and
duties passed between two natural persons, one may not assert
the privileges previously held by the other. In short, the current
differential treatment of natural persons and entities in
American privilege law is justifiable.
II. SHOULD A NATURAL PERSON'S EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGE FOR
COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO HIS PROPERTY AUTOMATICALLY
PASS TO A SUCCESSOR HOLDER OF THE TITLE TO THE PROPERTY?
As previously stated, under English law, when a natural
person transfers title to property to a new titleholder, the new
titleholder also takes the evidentiary privilege attaching to any
communications between the prior titleholder and an attorney
about the property.28 The state of the law in the United States is
radically different. In the United States, if the privilege survives
the original holder's death, 29 the privilege passes to the
decedent's personal representative. 30  Most often, the
representative is the executor or executrix of the decedent's
estate, named by the decedent in his or her will. If not, the
probate court appoints an administrator or administratrix. If,
under the jurisdiction's law, the privilege survives the discharge
of the personal representative, the decedent's heir or heirs
28 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
29 In some jurisdictions, the holder's death terminates the privilege. 1
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 15, § 6.5.2.b (Richard D. Friedman ed., 2002).
30 See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 953(c) (Deering 2004).
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become the holders of the privilege. 31  On this issue, the
American view is sounder.
Consider the categories of successor holders recognized
under American law. Unless the decedent was single or the
decedent's spouse is deceased or too elderly, the decedent is likely
to designate his or her spouse as executor or executrix. Absent a
designation by the decedent, the court will appoint an
administrator or administratix. In most jurisdictions, there is a
statutory preference for the appointment. California Probate
Code § 8461 is illustrative. In pertinent part, it reads:
[A] person in the following relation to the decedent is entitled to
appointment as administrator in the following order of priority:
(a) Surviving spouse or domestic partner as defined in Section
37.
(b) Children.
(c) Grandchildren.
(d) Other issue.
(e) Parents.
(f) Brothers and sisters.
(g) Issue of brothers and sisters.
(h) Grandparents. 32
The pattern continues. Heirship is determined by nearness of
generation to the decedent. 33 In sum, under American law, in all
probability the person who becomes successor holder by
operation of law will be someone with a family relationship to the
decedent. As a family member, the successor is in a good position
to both know the decedent's privacy concerns and to care enough
to respect them. As a member of the same family, the successor
may share the decedent's privacy concerns. The law conferred
the privilege on the original holder in order to protect his or her
privacy,3 4 and American law selects successor holders who, as
fellow family members, are likely to be motivated to act to shield
the decedent's personal privacy.
31 See EDMUND MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS IN EVIDENCE 116 (1961); 24
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5498, at 484 (1986).
32 CAL. PROB. CODE § 8461 (Deering 2004); see also N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT
LAW § 1001 (McKinney 1995) (order of priority for granting letters of
administration).
33 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 240 (Deering 2004); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS
LAW § 4-1.1 (McKinney 1998).
34 See 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 15, § 5.1.1 (Richard D. Friedman ed., 2002);
see also 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2285 (John T. McNaughton rev., 1961).
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As we have seen, in England, by operation of law, the
successor to the original holder's property interest takes the
evidentiary privilege cloaking the original holder's attorney-
client communications about the property. Yet, there may not be
any family relationship between the original and successor
holders. The two parties may be virtual strangers to each other.
The successor holder may know little or nothing about the
original holder's privacy concerns. For that matter, in the rare
case in which the successor holder was familiar with the original
holder's privacy preferences, the successor holder might have
minimal motivation to observe those preferences. Quite to the
contrary, if the transfer of title was an arm's length business
transaction, the successor holder is far more likely to be
motivated by his or her own economic interests and privacy
concerns. If it serves those interests, the successor holder will
waive the privilege even when the public disclosure of the
information will be mortifying to the original holder.
The difference between English and American law thus
poses the basic question of why the law should confer evidentiary
privileges in the first instance. There is no historical evidence
that the courts fashioned privileges for the specific purpose of
safeguarding property interests. Rather, to borrow a phrase from
Justice Harlan's famous concurrence in Katz v. United States,35
the Supreme Court's seminal 1967 decision on the coverage of the
Fourth Amendment, privileges were fashioned to "protect[]
people, not places" or property. 36 Admittedly, when a client
confidentially consults an attorney about a property transaction,
the law grants an evidentiary privilege. However, the privilege
does not attach only, or even primarily, because property rights
are implicated. Instead, ultimately the law confers the privilege
out of respect for the client as an autonomous person with
cognitive and volitional ability;3 7 the privilege facilitates the
client's acquisition of advice which will better enable the client to
make an intelligent choice as to his or her future.38
35 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
36 Id. at 351-53; see Sherry F. Colb, A World Without Privacy: Why Property
Does Not Define the Limits of the Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures,
102 MICH. L. REV. 889, 898, 903 (2004).
37 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 15, § 5.3.3.c(1)-(2), (11) (Richard D. Friedman
ed., 2002).
38 See generally id. § 5.3.3.
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In some attorney-client consultations about property rights,
the client has acute concerns about personal privacy, and those
concerns will be close to the surface of the conversation between
the client and the attorney. The property owner may want to
transfer rights to a third party because of the owner's secret,
intimate relationship with that person. Alternatively, the owner
may want to deny property rights to a family member because of
the latter's misconduct which, if publicly exposed, would be
humiliating to the entire family. However, even in consultations
in which privacy concerns are not as obvious, they are present
whenever a privilege attaches. The privilege cannot come into
play unless the original holder intended that the attorney would
maintain the secrecy of the communication in the future. 39 On
the face of the conversation, the client may be speaking "only"
about his or her finances, but they are the client's personal
finances. A client's financial plans and objectives are largely
determined by the client's family and social relationships.
Modernly, the courts have recognized that clients have a
legitimate privacy interest in maintaining the confidentiality of
personal financial information and records. 40 Some courts have
gone to the length of proclaiming that there is a qualified
constitutional right to informational privacy in such data.41
If the protection of privacy is the raison d'etre for granting
privilege protection, there is no need to automatically transfer
the original holder's evidentiary privilege to a third party merely
because that person has taken title to property formerly owned
by the original holder. Conferring holder status on the new
owner in no way promotes the policy of privilege protection. The
successor may not know the original holder's privacy preferences,
and even if the successor did, he or she might not be inclined to
invoke the privilege to protect those preferences. American law
confers automatic holder status only on categories of persons who
are likely to be sensitive to the original holder's personal privacy
concern; by doing so, American law hues much more faithfully to
the policy rationale for the creation of evidentiary privileges.
39 Id. § 6.8.2.
40 See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961); see also 1
IMWINKELREID, supra note 15, § 6.2.5, at 486-87 (Richard D. Friedman ed., 2002)
(describing growing judicial and legislative recognition of the need to protect private
financial information).
41 See 1 IMWINKELREID, supra note 15, § 6.2.5, at 489 & n.338 (Richard D.
Friedman ed., 2002).
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III. SHOULD THE ORIGINAL TITLEHOLDER BE ABLE TO
VOLUNTARILY ALIENATE HIS ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
PROTECTING COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO THE PROPERTY TO A
SUCCESSOR TITLEHOLDER?
If the original holder's privilege should not pass by operation
of law to the new titleholder, should the law at least allow the
original holder to voluntarily alienate the privilege to the new
titleholder? That is a much closer question.
In most cases under American law, property rights are freely
alienable, 42 and contract rights are assignable. 43 Yet, there are
many instances in which that generalization breaks down. In a
large number of cases, the courts have upheld restraints on the
alienation of property.44 By way of example, the courts have
frequently sustained spendthrift trusts restricting the
beneficiary's right to assign future income45 and limitations on
the rights of life tenants to alienate their estate.46 Further, the
courts have often sustained the validity of constraints on the
alienability of corporate stock, especially in the setting of family-
owned businesses. 47 In addition, certain types of causes of action
are non-assignable. 48  Thus, there is authority that a claim for
42 See generally 3 SIMES & SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS ch. 37 (John
A. Borron, Jr. ed., 3d ed. 2004).
43 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 11.4 (3d ed. 1999).
44 See, e.g., Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 392 P.2d 265, 268 (Cal. 1964) (stating
that "reasonable restraints designed to protect justifiable interests of the parties"
are valid), overruled on other grounds by Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 582 P.2d 970
(Cal. 1978); Tracey v. Franklin, 67 A.2d 56, 59 (Del. 1949) (explaining that the court
will uphold a restraint that is "a reasonable means of accomplishing a purpose
recognized as proper"); Lawson v. Redmoor Corp., 679 P.2d 972, 975 (Wash. Ct. App.
1984) (discussing that the court will sustain an indirect restraint if it is "reasonable
[and] ... justified by the legitimate expectations of the parties") (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
45 See Coast Bank, 392 P.2d at 268 (finding that spendthrift trust restrictions
promote "the settlor's interest in protecting potentially improvident beneficiaries"
from their own foolishness); Milner v. Outcalt, 219 P.2d 982, 984 (Wash. 1950) ("The
essential idea of a spendthrift trust is that the beneficiary cannot deprive himself of
the right to future income under the trust.").
46 See Coast Bank, 392 P.2d at 268 (noting that certain reasonable restraints on
alienation protect the interests of the remaindermen); Farkas v. Farkas, 38 S.E.2d
924, 926 (Ga. 1946).
47 See Dixie Pipe Sales, Inc. v. Perry, 834 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992). The
court found that the restriction served the legitimate purpose of "keep[ing] the stock
in the family." Id. at 494. The court stated in dictum that such a restriction might be
invalid in the case of a large corporation with numerous, unrelated shareholders. See
id.
48 See Stichting Ter Behartiging Van De Belangen Van Oudaandeelhouders In
20061
ST. JOHN'S LAWREVIEW
attorney malpractice cannot be assigned. In forbidding
assignment, one court stressed "the personal nature of the
attorney's duty to the client and the confidentiality of the
attorney-client relationship."49 More broadly, a restriction on the
assignability of a contract right is valid when the relationship
between the contracting parties is an intensely personal one, 50
and it would be unfair to require the obligor to render
performance to an assignee he or she had not chosen. Suppose,
for instance, that an individual agreed to serve as the personal,
confidential secretary of a business executive. Subsequently, the
executive attempts to assign the right to the individual's services
to another businessperson. If the court upheld the assignment,
the individual would have to serve as the confidential secretary
of a different person.51 It would be manifestly unjust to force the
individual to do so because, in deciding whether to enter into the
original agreement, the individual undoubtedly considered the
Het Kapitaal Van Saybolt International B.V. v. Schreiber, 407 F.3d 34, 50 n.8 (2d
Cir. 2005) ("Connecticut law does bar assignment of personal injury claims .... );
Essex Ins. Co. v. Five Star Dye House, Inc., 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 696, 698 (Ct. App. 2005)
(stating that causes or rights of action founded upon wrongs of a purely personal
nature such as slander, assault and battery, negligent personal injuries, criminal
conversation, seduction, breach of marriage promise, and malicious prosecution are
not transferable or assignment), depublished by 111 P.3d 921 (Cal. 2005); Michael
Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697, 699 & n.1
(2005).
49 Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 83, 87 (Ct. App. 1976).
50 See Sally Beauty Co. v. Nexxus Products Co., 801 F.2d 1001, 1008 (7th Cir.
1986); Munchak Corp. v. Cunningham, 457 F.2d 721, 725 (4th Cir. 1972)
(determining that in a contract for the personal services of a professional basketball
player "the right to performance of a personal service contract requiring special
skills and based upon the personal relationship between the parties cannot be
assigned without... consent"); US Fax Law Ctr., Inc. v. IHIRE, Inc., 362 F. Supp.
2d 1248, 1251 (D. Colo. 2005) ("Under Colorado law, '[w]hile the law favors
assignability of rights generally, it does not allow assignments for matters of
personal trust or confidence, or for personal services.' ") (alteration in original)
(quoting Roberts v. Holland & Hart, 857 P.2d 492, 495 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993)); Taylor
v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 241, 248 (1866) ("Rare genius and extraordinary skill are not
transferable, and contracts for their employment.., cannot be assigned."); Martin v.
City of O'Fallon, 670 N.E.2d 1238, 1241 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (finding that a labor
union could not assign its right to demand arbitration against the city). The Martin
court found that "the personal nature of the roles of each party" justified restricting
the assignment of the right and the "right of a party to choose with whom he or she
contracts underlies any determination of whether a contract is assignable." Martin,
670 N.E.2d at 1241; see also First Ill. Nat'l Bank v. Knapp, 615 N.E.2d 75, 78 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993); Rural Elec. Convenience Coop. Co. v. Soyland Power Coop., Inc., 606
N.E.2d 1269, 1275 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); FARNSWORTH, supra note 43, § 11.4, at 715.
51 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 43, § 11.4, at 715.
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character and discretion of the business executive. 52 It would be
inequitable to compel the individual to serve another
businessperson.
Although, as we have seen, there are many instances in
which property and contract rights are deemed inalienable, there
is a plausible argument that it is especially appropriate to
empower the original holder to transfer an evidentiary privilege.
As Part II noted, the law confers privileges in large part out of
respect for the holder's autonomy. The argument runs that the
holder will be able to exercise that autonomy more effectively-
that is, more intelligently-if the holder can consult an expert
confidant such as an attorney before making an important life
preference choice.53  It arguably also promotes the holder's
autonomy by giving effect to the holder's voluntary decision to
transfer the privilege to the new titleholder.
By way of counter-argument, it initially might be contended
that the original holder could err tragically in thinking that in
the future, the new titleholder will act to protect the original
holder's privacy. If that were the only counter-argument, though,
the case against alienability would be weak. If the original
holder is an autonomous person in a democratic society, he or she
should presumptively be allowed to assess and run that risk.
However, there is a further, more potent counter-argument. The
case for permitting alienation rests on the implicit assumption
that the only interests at stake are the personal privacy concerns
of the original holder. However, evidentiary privileges are not
mere private "commodities."54  Rather, evidentiary privileges
have a profound impact on the public interest. The successful
assertion of a privilege can result in the suppression of reliable,
critical evidence. It can deprive the courts of evidence they need
to reach an accurate verdict. The public has a compelling
interest in the effective functioning of the courts as fact-finding
tribunals. That public interest is so substantial that in an
52 See id.; see also Smith, Bell & Hauck, Inc. v. Cullins, 183 A.2d 528, 532 (Vt.
1962) ("[Where] the personal characteristics of the employment contract permeate
the entire transaction ... the employee's [promise] is confined to the employer with
whom the undertaking was made.").
53 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 15, § 5.3.3.c(4)-(9) (Richard D. Friedman ed.,
2002).
54 Cf. Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 83, 87 (Ct. App. 1976)
(stating that a claim for attorney malpractice is not a "commodity to be exploited" in
the marketplace).
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extreme case, it can override even a constitutionally-based
privilege such as the Presidential privilege. 55 As the Supreme
Court pointed out in the landmark case of United States v.
Nixon,56 there is a vital public interest in "the fair
administration" of the justice system. 57 In Nixon, the Court ruled
that even Presidential privilege had to yield to a "demonstrated,
specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial."5 8
Although the public interest in discovering all the relevant facts
is typically stronger in criminal cases, the same interest exists in
civil litigation.59 Thus, when the need for a privileged item of
evidence in a civil case has been acute, some cases have
analogized to Nixon and surmounted evidentiary privileges on
constitutional grounds.60
The transfer of a privilege between an original titleholder
and his successor is more than a purely private economic
transaction. If the original holder of a privilege could transfer
that privilege to a third party, the third party would be in a
position to deny the courts needed evidence and frustrate the
functioning of the public's premier dispute resolution tribunals.
Placing that strain on the public interest might be justifiable if
allowing the transfer significantly promoted the social policies
inspiring the creation of evidentiary privileges. However, on
close scrutiny, it becomes apparent that allowing the transfer
would not effectuate the rationale for recognizing privileges. In
truth, it would undercut that rationale.
To begin with, allowing the original holder to transfer the
privilege to a successor titleholder would not serve the policies
underpinning evidentiary privileges. It is true that doing so
would permit the new titleholder to maintain the secrecy of the
prior communications, if he chose to assert the privilege.
However, the protection of that secrecy is not the privacy interest
inspiring privilege law. As Dean Wigmore explained in his
classic treatise, one of the central purposes of privilege law is to
encourage laypersons to consult with and make revelations to
55 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 15, § 7.6.4 (Richard D. Friedman ed., 2002).
56 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
57 Id. at 713.
58 Id.
59 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 15, § 11.5.3 (Richard D. Friedman ed., 2002).
60 See, e.g., Adams v. St. Francis Reg'l Med. Ctr., 955 P.2d 1169, 1186-87 (Kan.
1998); see also Baptist Mem'l Hosp.-Union County v. Johnson, 754 So.2d 1165,
1168-69 (Miss. 2000).
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confidants such as attorneys.61 Privilege law serves that purpose
by giving the layperson assurances that: (1) a privilege attaches
at the time of the communication, and (2) the privilege protection
continues permanently, ordinarily terminating only if and when
the holder chooses to waive the privilege. Those assurances will
presumably make the layperson more willing to consult and
confide. Allowing the original holder to transfer the privilege to a
successor titleholder in no way enhances either assurance. Yet,
upholding the transfer would enable the successor to obstruct a
judicial search for truth. Thus, treating the transfer as effective
impinges on the public interest without advancing the social
policies that can countervail against the public interest and
justify the obstruction.
Worse still, in the long term, upholding the transfer will
undermine those social policies. Suppose that the courts adopt
the view that such transfers are valid. Assume further that it
becomes a matter of common, public knowledge that that is the
state of the law. How would those assumptions affect the typical
bargain for the purchase of property? On those assumptions, it
will probably become a routine practice for the purchaser to
demand that the seller both convey title to the property and
transfer any related evidentiary privilege. If the purchaser is
acting in his or her rational self-interest, he or she will naturally
want to control the related privilege in the future. If disclosure
of the privileged communications would damage their interests,
they would want the power to suppress the communications by
asserting the privilege. If disclosure would serve their interests,
they would want the power to divulge the communications by
waiving the privilege. The prospective buyer will have a
practical incentive to bargain for all of the original holder's
interests-lock, stock, barrel, and privilege. In short, treating
the privilege as transferable would reduce the permanence of the
protection presently afforded the original holder. At the time of
his communication with the attorney, the original holder will
realize that if he later attempts to sell the property, the
prospective buyer will probably demand that the original holder
surrender the privilege as well as title. The net result is that the
privilege protection accorded the original will be less secure than
it is under the current state of the law. At first blush, granting
61 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2285 (John T. McNaughton rev., 1961).
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the original holder the power to transfer might seem to benefit
the holder by expanding his or her bundle of legal rights.
Paradoxically, that expansion would erode the primary privacy
rights that the holder now enjoys under privilege law.
IV. EVEN IF EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES SHOULD BE DEEMED
NON-TRANSFERABLE, SHOULD THE ORIGINAL HOLDER AS
PRINCIPAL BE PERMITTED TO DESIGNATE THE NEW TITLEHOLDER
AN AGENT, AUTHORIZED TO DECIDE, ON THE BASIS OF THE NEW
TITLEHOLDER'S INTERESTS, WHETHER TO ASSERT OR WAIVE THE
PRINCIPAL'S PRIVILEGE?
The preceding sections present an extended argument that
as a matter of policy, evidentiary privileges should not be
transferable to the new titleholder either by operation of law or
even by the original holder's voluntary act. However, as may
already have occurred to the reader, that argument will be much
ado about nothing if the original holder can easily circumvent the
prohibition by appointing the new titleholder as the original
holder's permanent agent for the purpose of deciding, based on
the new titleholder's interests, whether to waive or assert the
privilege. Although this expedient has some superficial
plausibility, in the final analysis it will prove ineffective.
Initially, assume that at the time of the conveyance of title,
in general terms the original holder purports to appoint the new
titleholder as his "agent" for the purposes of deciding whether to
assert or waive the privilege. The agreement is ambiguous; it
does not expressly state that the new titleholder may make the
decision on the basis of an assessment of their personal interests.
A question of interpretation arises: Should that general
agreement be construed to mean that the new titleholder may
make the decision on the basis of his own interests, or should the
agreement be interpreted as requiring the new titleholder to
protect the original holder's privacy interests? Without more, the
courts would adopt the latter interpretation. As the Restatement
on Agency points out, one of the inherent obligations of any agent
is a duty of loyalty to the principal. 62 Given that duty, the agent
62 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 387 (1958); see also
LEONARD LAKIN & MARTIN SCHIFF, THE LAW OF AGENCY § 67, at 105 (1984)
(explaining that the agent owes the principal an "absolute" duty of "undivided
loyalty"; it is the agent's "supreme" duty to the principal); FLOYD R. MECHEM,
OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 500, at 345 (4th ed. 1952) (explaining that the
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must act "solely for the benefit of the principal."63 Being subject
to fiduciary duties, an agent may not pursue his own interests.64
This axiom is so well settled that "[i]f a relation is created for any
other purpose, it is not [an] agency."65 In that light, the courts
would balk at interpreting the ambiguous provision as
authorizing the new titleholder to make the decision on the basis
of an assessment of his own interests. As an "agent," the new
titleholder would be required to focus solely on the principal's
interest. Of course, so interpreted, the agreement would be
ineffective as a means of circumventing the prohibition. The new
titleholder is bargaining for the right to make the decision on the
basis of his own self-interest. The ambiguous agreement would
not be construed as giving the new titleholder that right.
Alternatively, assume that the new titleholder bargained for
and obtained an explicit agreement. The carefully drafted
agreement says in no uncertain terms that although the original
holder is appointing the new titleholder as an "agent," the
"agent" may make the decision on the basis of an evaluation of
his own interests-an agreement that explicit would serve as an
effective expedient if the courts were willing to enforce the
agreement. The rub is that the agreement is almost assuredly
unenforceable on the ground of illegality. An agent is a
fiduciary.66  It is black letter law that a contract provision
violating or impairing a fiduciary's duty of loyalty is illegal as
offending public policy.67  Illegal contract provisions are
unenforceable. 68 Hence, no matter how express its wording, the
provision will fail as an effective expedient. The upshot is that
neither the original holder nor the new titleholder can escape
from the norm that the original holder's evidentiary privilege is
inalienable.
agent has a duty of "utmost loyalty to the interests of his principal").
63 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 387.
64 See id. § 13 cmt. b; MECHEM, supra note 62, § 500, at 345.
65 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 387 cmt. a.
66 Id. § 13.
67 7 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §16:13, at
391-94 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 1997).
68 See 6A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1373 (1962); see also
FARNSWORTH, supra note 43, § 5.1.
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CONCLUSION
In HLC Properties Ltd., the California Supreme Court came
to the right result. More importantly, the case highlights a long
neglected issue in the law of evidentiary privileges, namely, the
question of the alienability of privileges. The preceding analysis
of that question yields important insights into the very nature of
privileges.
Why should the law not provide that the related attorney-
client privilege of a natural person who was the original
titleholder passes to the new owner by operation of law when the
original titleholder conveys related property to a new owner?
Again, that is the English view. That outcome would be sound if
evidentiary privileges were merely property rights. However,
privileges are far more than economic commodities. 69 They are
incidents of personal relationships between a natural person and
a confidant, and they are designed to protect the privacy of the
consultation.70 In the typical case, the new titleholder will have
little knowledge of or concern about the original holder's privacy
preferences. Consequently, it would be inconsistent with the
essential nature of the privilege to automatically treat the new
owner as a successor holder of the privilege.
Similarly, why should the law not provide that, at least by
voluntary act, a natural person who was the original titleholder
may transfer the related privilege to the new owner? In part, the
answer is that in the long term, a norm of transferability would
undermine the protection for the original holder's privacy. Given
a norm of transferability, eventually it would become a routine
practice for the prospective buyer to demand the privilege as well
as title to the property. The original holder's privacy protection
would be less secure than it is under the current state of the law.
However, that is only part of the answer. The other, more
revealing, part of the answer is that the proponents of
transferability overlook the fact that privileges have a profound
impact on the public interest, often obstructing the judicial
search for truth. It is one thing to allow the original holder to
interpose an obstruction to protect the privacy which is the policy
justification for creating the privilege in the first instance. It
69 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
70 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 15, § 5.3.3.c(11) (Richard D. Friedman ed., 2002).
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would be quite another matter-an unjustifiable expansion of the
privilege-to countenance obstruction by a third party whose
secrecy interests have no connection to the original holder's
privacy concerns.
In the final analysis, evidentiary privileges are incidents of
personal relationships, which affect the compelling public
interest in the judicial search for truth. Given their personal
nature, they should not be treated as private economic
commodities. Moreover, in Dean Wigmore's words, given their
impact on the public interest, they must be "strictly confined
within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of'
the privacy protection inspiring their creation.71 The gist of that
logic is that by assuring the original holder permanent privacy
protection, the law encourages the holder to consult with and
disclose to confidants such as attorneys. A norm of
transferability not only would not further that logic; in addition,
as we have seen, that norm would ultimately weaken the
protection for the original holder's privacy. In a very real sense,
the current norm of non-transferability is a corollary of the
essential nature of natural persons' evidentiary privileges.
71 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2291, at 554 (John T. MeNaughton rev., 1961).
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